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World Health Organization and emergency health: if
not now, when?
In light of the recent Ebola epidemic, Francesco Checchi and colleagues argue that the World
Health Organization’s response to health emergencies is not fit for purpose and put forward six
proposals to reform WHO’s crisis response
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Human transmission of Ebola virus began in Guinea in
December 2013, but inadequate surveillance and alert
systems—characteristic of fragile states1—delayed its
recognition until March 2014.2 TheWorld Health Organization
has acknowledged it was ineffective during this critical early
phase.3 Its Guinea office may have slowed down the response,4
while headquarters, fearing political and economic repercussions
for countries affected, delayed declaring an international
emergency until August 2014.5 The epidemic has caused at least
11 300 deaths from Ebola,6 unquantified indirect excess
mortality, and severe societal effects.7 8 The outbreak may not
have been preventable, but its calamitous overspill was a
quintessential failure of surveillance and containment. This
failure has spurred various analyses of the global emergency
health response system.9 10 Various groups have formulated
recommendations, including those set up by the United Nations
secretary general, the Overseas Development Institute,11 the
United States Institute of Medicine,12 Harvard University and
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
(LSHTM),13 and WHO itself (the Ebola interim assessment
panel).14
WHO is mandated to lead the Global Health Cluster (the global
humanitarian system’s main mechanism for coordinating health
agencies’ response to crises except refugee scenarios), support
member states and non-state organisations in crisis preparedness
and response, provide surge resources in emergencies, establish
and disseminate technical standards, enforce the international
health regulations (IHR) for managing health emergencies, and
report attacks on health workers.15
While a process to reform WHO more generally has been
ongoing since 2010, the Ebola epidemic has hastened calls to
improve WHO’s crisis response functions.16 A January 2015
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resolution17 of the organisation’s executive board requests
changes beginning January 2016. WHO has appointed an
external advisory group to help formulate reforms.18 Here, as
field practitioners and academics specialised in public health
during crises, we recommend improvements to WHO’s crisis
response functions based on our experience and a non-systematic
literature review of previous attempts at WHO reform. Though
in this article we focus on WHO, we concur with others that
many organisations (including other UN agencies,
non-governmental organisations, governments, public health
and research institutions) involved in epidemic preparedness,
surveillance, response, and research and development must also
evolve.11 13 19 20 While others have concentrated on epidemics,
we take an all hazard perspective, recognising the large caseload
of natural disasters (175 million people affected in 201521) and
armed conflict (172million in 201322), and their frequent overlap
with epidemics.23
What is actually wrong with WHO?
The Ebola epidemic was the culmination of multiple instances,
mainly undocumented, of WHO underperformance in crises.
The box summarises recent examples, partially based on our
direct observations. These examples delineate six stand-out
problems, as discussed below.
Prioritisation of political over technical
considerations
WHO’s emergency response framework 32 sets guidelines for
managing new emergencies. However, its current version is
arguably too focused on process rather than action and does not
attribute authority to WHO when governments or other bodies
are responding inappropriately.WHO’s leadership of the Global
Health Cluster provides a legitimate avenue for establishing
sector leadership and coordination, though this approach relies
on agencies’ voluntary participation. The International Health
Regulations provide instruments to deal with the inter-country
dimensions of large epidemics, though they ascribe little
authority to WHO to enforce technical recommendations.
Improvements to the regulations, including earlier triggers for
smaller outbreaks and incentives for countries to report and
comply, have been recommended,20 and the regulations are
under review.
Constitutionally, WHO is governed by member states, with
senior managers at headquarters, regional, and country offices
appointed with the approval of national ministers of health.9 33 34
While preventing hegemony by powerful stakeholders, this
political dependency has degenerated into a culture that rewards
protocol over substance; caution over courage; hierarchy over
competence; conservatism in estimating problems; and
obfuscation of evidence that might challenge relations with
governments or donors. Public health considerations are often
sidelined,35 and in high stakes situations such as Ebola virus
disease and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
epidemics, or state based conflict, political conditioning of
WHO’s response at country level often drives decision making
at higher levels of the organisation. This is a reversal of the
power structure required to respond to complex emergencies
and obstructsWHO’s role of brokering data collection, analysis,
and dissemination.
WHO’s tendency to maintain the status quo36 is not exceptional:
many organisations become subservient to their own
bureaucracy and political pressures. WHO, however, stands out
for its inability to overcome these obstacles in times of crisis.
Non-meritocratic human resources
approach, with little reference to crisis
response competencies
WHO replaced all three country representatives in Guinea,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone as the Ebola response was scaled up,
indicating that key staff who should kickstart the organisation’s
emergency responses in the field are often unsuited.37 WHO
does not necessarily reward or promote based on merit, and
staff performance management is constrained by the often short
duration of staff contracts. Many senior positions are filled
through informal political appointments.
Moreover, technical, managerial, and soft leadership
competencies are not sufficiently considered during hiring and
professional development of staff who oversee the response to
crises (such as country representatives).36 Internal bureaucracy
required to hire staff, or second people from other agencies,
also curtails emergency responses.
Aloofness from civil society partners and
neglect of sector coordination and
leadership functions
WHO has traditionally prioritised its relationship with
governments over that with civil society (non-governmental
organisations, academic groups, professional associations), and
headquarter, regional, and country staff with roles in managing
crises (particularly epidemics) often have insufficient
understanding of the international humanitarian architecture.4 19
There is an unresolved tension between WHO’s conflicting
mandates of supporting governments, and coordinating and
leading the health sector during crises, particularly when
governments are a party to conflict or obstruct the response.
Three areas have suffered from this neglect. Firstly, WHO has
not sufficiently taken up sector leadership and coordination and
is often perceived by non-governmental partners as a conduit
for political agendas. WHO’s leadership of the Global Health
Cluster (set up in 2005) has been inadequate. Until 2014, only
one headquarter staff member was dedicated to the cluster
secretariat, and most of the 24 activated field clusters are
inadequately staffed. Key areas of work (cluster coordinator
training, roll-out of epidemiology and information management
tools, raising cluster funding) have progressed slowly. Other
UN agencies (Unicef, the World Food Programme, UNHCR)
are more amenable to collaboration with civic society and have
been more successful at leading and coordinating field
operations. For example, clinical management of rape has
primarily been tackled by the Global Protection Cluster, led by
UNHCR, despite this being a health intervention.
Secondly, WHO has not played a major role in developing
standards and policy for crises, though this normative function
is arguably its principal strength in other areas of work. Such
normative work should include developing a stronger evidence
base for the health related technical standards of Sphere (the
most widely used guidance for humanitarian interventions)38
and other guidelines, which currently mostly reflect expert
opinion. Similar problems exist with the “process standards”
setting out expected actions at different stages of an emergency,
including preparedness and recovery or mitigation. This role
has partly been filled by other agencies, particularly Médecins
Sans Frontières and the US Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. Building the requisite capacity of emergency
response agencies and staff at the scale required to tackle
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Examples of past WHO underperformance
Northern Uganda, 2005— In June-July 2005, WHO and the Ministry of Health jointly conducted a survey24 of health conditions in
overcrowded, underserviced camps where about 1.2 million people displaced by conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army lived. The
survey showed very high rates of death and abduction. The report was rejected by the Ugandan government, and pro-government media
suggested methodological flaws and data fabrication. WHO not only failed to defend the survey’s findings but also impeded its publication
in peer reviewed journals25
Zimbabwe, 2005-06— Following the 2005 elections in Zimbabwe, the government implemented “Operation Murambatsvina” to forcibly
evict at least half a million urban dwellers mostly from opposition supporting slums in Harare, then home to the WHO Regional Office
for Africa. Government officials justified the operation26 but humanitarian organisations reported alarming health effects and increasing
food insecurity.27 An unpublished survey by Johns Hopkins University found that mortality in the affected population increased by about
60% in the year after displacement, mostly attributable to reduced HIV service. No record of WHO highlighting the plight of those
displaced was found, and the agency had minimal involvement in assisting affected communities. One of the survey investigators was
asked for mortality data by WHO staff in Geneva, who expressed frustration with WHO Harare for insisting that no information was
available
Sri Lanka, 2009—The last stage of armed conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in
March-May 2009, resulted in a concentration of trapped combatants and civilians on a narrow peninsula, with undocumented casualties
from indiscriminate bombing. Survivors were held in camps for weeks by the Sri Lankan government. WHO maintained a minimal
presence in the camps and generated no information on the public health situation, despite reports of a high death rate and poor water
and sanitation conditions.28 The regional WHO office did not request assistance from headquarters, and even discouraged staff in Geneva
from offering support. Human rights abuses, widely known to have occurred, were not documented
Haiti, 2010—In the days following the massive 2010 earthquake, when agencies began to flood into Haiti and technical coordination
and leadership staff were most needed, the WHO country representative prevented headquarters staff from deploying to support the
country office, for unknown reasons. WHO’s response accelerated only after the director general insisted that an officer be appointed
to fulfil WHO’s responsibilities as health cluster coordinator. The slow action contributed to a delayed health assessment and prevented
effective coordination of the numerous, variably professional agencies and medical groups intervening across the country
Horn of Africa, 2013— In May 2013, polio virus was detected in Somalia for the first time in six years, and soon afterwards in Kenya
and Ethiopia. By year’s end, 217 cases were identified in the three countries. WHO’s response involved two regional offices–Africa and
Eastern Mediterranean. In October 2013, the independent monitoring board of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative praised the leadership
shown by the Eastern Mediterranean director but noted that at the field level, the response was poorly coordinated and lacked urgency,
with key positions remaining unfilled. The board’s report concluded that “the response in the Horn of Africa could not be described as
a robust response to a public health emergency of global importance”29
Syria, 2013-14—As of January 2013, about four million Syrians were living in opposition controlled or disputed territory, with growing
public health needs. Turkey was the main access point for these populations, and also the base for most humanitarian agencies. WHO,
still formally acting in assistance to the Damascus Ministry of Health, was warned not to offer any support to opposition areas. A WHO
suboffice was opened in Turkey, but solely to assist Syrian refugees in Turkey; staff almost never attended coordination meetings for
work inside Syria organised by non-governmental organisations, even when a polio outbreak was detected in opposition areas.30 As
late as mid-2015, despite a UN resolution authorising the provision of formal assistance, WHO had not substantially strengthened its
Turkey team and played a minimal role in supporting public health interventions in opposition held areas of Syria
South Sudan, 2013-14— WHO did not react publicly to the killing of patients in hospital beds, with looting and burning of hospitals,
during armed conflict in December 2013 and February 2014. Instead, it focused mainly on reporting disease outbreaks31
Central African Republic, 2013-14—During the acute phase after a coup, collapse and widespread looting of the health system, and
outbreaks of ethnic conflict, WHO did not substantially reinforce its country office, and a single, part-time staffer served as health cluster
coordinator. Essential information management activities, including coordination matrices and epidemic disease surveillance, were
delayed by months and surveillance covered only the capital, Bangui. Public health strategic planning was slow and non-transparent,
and critical issues such as vaccination strategy and payment of health workers to return to work were left unresolved
multiple emergencies at once, however, has been globally
neglected.
Thirdly, WHO has been timid in promoting health standards
and quality control of crisis responses, though it has no formal
enforcing authority. The Sphere project and other initiatives
have tried to shift emergency response from a philanthropic
(whereby any charitable act is helpful and not to be questioned)
to a rights based model, but this transformation is incomplete.
There is no formal professional certification of individuals or
organisations and little recourse for people who are denied
access to or provided with inappropriate services. As an
exception, the current WHO emergency medical teams project
to certify, standardise, and coordinate international medical
groups deploying into natural disasters has enhanced the quality
of recent surgical responses in Nepal and the Philippines. This
project merits consideration as a model for ensuring that
agencies and individuals do not operate without regulation,
oversight, or enforcement.
Lack of internal and external
accountability
Accountability to beneficiaries is increasingly emphasised in
humanitarian practice.39 WHO, however, sees itself as
accountable to and providing technical assistance to
governments, even those with dubious legitimacy.4 Although
WHO’s performance is overseen by member states and,
specifically, its executive board, these governance arrangements
do not enable in-depth monitoring of crisis performance; this
would require objective metrics and systematic evaluations by
independent experts.
Whereas most humanitarian agencies have internal monitoring
and evaluation teams and frameworks, WHO has limited
mechanisms or incentives for evaluating itself objectively and
tackling underperformance. Its headquarters is institutionally
averse to effecting change in the regions despite disbursing
general funds to them,40 possibly because regional offices can
block central influence on countries.41 Generally, WHO’s
management has discouraged transparency and admission of
fault, exemplified in May 2015 by the self censorship of an
unusually candid statement of responsibilities for the Ebola
disaster, which was replaced by a heavily sanitised version
within hours of publication.42 This tendency undermines
opportunities for learning that are fundamental for self
improvement. Admittedly, external observers, including the
media, have not always generated constructive, actionable
criticism of WHO.
Problems with current structure
Over the past decade WHO headquarters, particularly its
humanitarian and epidemic divisions, has experienced ongoing
restructure and reform33 43 44 with no observable leap in
performance. Nevertheless, the current split between teams
working on epidemic and pandemic control and those focusing
on armed conflicts and disasters (which are better linked to the
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wider humanitarian architecture) is widely seen as unhelpful
and is being removed at headquarters through the creation of a
single outbreaks and health emergencies division.13 16 45
Moreover, WHO’s crisis response structure differs in the
headquarters, regions, and countries, precluding a fully unified
approach.
Insufficient flexible funding for crisis
functions
The reduction of its core, unrestricted funding, cited by WHO
as a reason for its low performance during the Ebola epidemic,
reflects donors’ increasingly vertical approach but also low
donor confidence in WHO’s ability to manage funds
responsibly.33 46 Shrinking core funding and staff cuts have
impeded strategic planning and timely response.4 13 Instead of
engaging with WHO to demand greater performance in crises
in exchange for adequate, flexible funding, donors have broadly
withdrawn interest and support, or sponsored non-WHO
solutions like UNAIDS and the Global Fund for AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria.
Six proposals for reform
There is no single recipe for improvement nor a clear
encouraging precedent. The past two decades have seen several
ineffective attempts at WHO reform.43 44 47 48 We believe that
any reform will fall short of desirable outcomes unless the
problems listed above are explicitly tackled,12 guided by a clear
plan with objectives and expected outcomes at country, regional,
and headquarters level. Broad measures, with which we largely
concur, have already been recommended by the executive
board,17 WHO’s Ebola interim assessment panel,14 and
others.11 13 16 19Aside from restructuringWHO headquarters, the
current reform process seems to be focusing on topics (the
financing of a $100m emergency fund; the establishment of a
global health emergency workforce) that are secondary to more
fundamental changes.
The table⇓ lays out six proposals for reformingWHO in relation
to the critical problems identified above. Aspects of these
proposals would doubtlessly encounter resistance and carry
transactional costs, with a foreseeable period of turmoil.
However, a conservative, more cosmetic approach would
probably leaveWHO at risk of even further reputational damage
and dismemberment13 and populations exposed to substandard
responses.
Incisive reforms now may be less expensive in absolute terms
than maintaining the status quo (particularly considering the
cost of poorly controlled emergencies such as Ebola, and the
inefficiency of multiple WHO-like global health institutions).
Indeed, we argue that the $100m health emergency fund (only
about 2% of total humanitarian funding for Ebola alone in west
Africa as of August 201549) does not reflect a real need and is
unlikely to be spent efficiently; instead funds should be
earmarked for refreshing staffing of critical posts and creating
a pool of technical experts within WHO and partner agencies
to fill leadership and coordination roles in emergencies, backed
up by a well resourced professional development plan.
Not all parts of WHO’s crisis response are dysfunctional. The
Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), also known as
WHO’s Americas Regional Office (AMRO), has a tradition of
effective response to disasters, facilitated by more streamlined
governance.WHO’sWestern Pacific Regional Office (WPRO)
has overseen substantive responses to recent disasters in the
Philippines. Both these regional offices have supported
countries’ emergency preparedness.WHOdoes groundbreaking
work on mental health in emergencies, has recently established
a functional cholera vaccine stockpile, and its emergency
medical team project appears to be succeeding. Numerous
experienced specialists in epidemics and other hazards work
across the organisation. Clearly, a nuanced approach is needed
to preserve what works well. Our proposals are not aimed at
strengthening regional and country offices other than through
professional development. Transferring authority and resources
back to these offices is a desirable next stage in reform but will
require major investments to improve their governance and
management.
Governance of WHO and its reform
While the appointment of an external advisory body is welcome,
WHO needs to go further in establishing transparency and
oversight of the reform process. We propose that an external,
independent governance committee be established for the new
all hazards, outbreaks, and health emergencies division,
composed primarily of people with minimal institutional
allegiances (unlike the current advisory committee) and strong
expertise in public health in emergencies or organisational
management. This committee could be modelled on the
independent monitoring board of the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative, credited with improving oversight and accountability
for that programme.50 It should independently appraise and
validate WHO’s reform proposals. A work plan with clear
milestones should be agreed, containing conditions for release
of further funding and, if reform falls greatly short of
commitments, the option of entrusting crisis related functions
to a new entity outside of WHO, with WHO contributing in a
diminished capacity. The external committee should provide
ongoing strategic management of the all hazards division (table),
thereby safeguarding WHO from internal reticence to change.
As reform moves forward, WHO’s main influencers—that is,
its member states and principal donors—need to revise their
relationship with the organisation, investing more resources in
effective, real time governance and performance evaluation
while simultaneously releasing proportionally more unrestricted
funding to the organisation and empowering WHO’s managers
to focus on evidence based crisis responses, not political
relations, as recommended by the Harvard-LSHTM panel.13 A
constitutional change, reducingWHO’s dependency onmember
states or allowing WHO in specific crisis situations to report
solely to the UN, may be required to enshrine such a shift.
Similarly, civil society agencies should show greater willingness
to engage with WHO and coordination mechanisms like the
Global Health Cluster, freeing up resources to bolster WHO’s
staffing. In turn, greater involvement of civil society should be
seen as an indicator of improved WHO performance.
Conclusion
In 1994, ineffective coordination and delayed response to the
influx of about one million Rwandan refugees into camps in
Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo contributed
to some of the highest death rates ever measured in humanitarian
settings.51 This disaster resulted in historic initiatives to
professionalise the humanitarian sector, including the Sphere
standards.38 Two decades later, the failure to control the Ebola
epidemic in its early manageable phase may be a watershed of
comparable importance.
The Ebola response has highlighted the need for many agencies
and governments to urgently upgrade their capability to
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intervene in all types of crises. However, such improvements
will struggle to attain their potential if the world’s coordinating
and technical leadership body remains unchanged. Indeed, if
WHO cannot be reformed to allow it to occupy this pre-eminent
position, some other multilateral entity must be allowed to
assume it.
We believe that an effective, empowered WHO is a far better
solution for global health governance, and for public health
coordination and leadership in emergencies, than a multiplicity
of partly overlapping entities, not all recognised by governments
and at greater risk of becoming subservient to the most powerful
governments and donors. To become the world’s chief healer
in times of crisis, WHO needs to consent to major surgery. The
thousands dead because of the uncontained Ebola epidemic in
west Africa stand silent witness to the human cost of delayed,
politically constrained use of available public health data,
coordination, andmeans of response. A radical reform ofWHO
cannot be delayed any further.
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Table
Table 1| Six proposals for WHO reform*
Expected challenges/risksProblem(s) tackledProposal and specific actions or changes
Internal restructuring and streamlining, with external governance
Internal resistance, restructure fatigueAloofness from civil society
partners and neglect of sector
coordination and leadership
functions
Merge the emergency/humanitarian (polio and emergencies) and epidemic/pandemic
(health security) divisions into a single all hazards crises division (this is now in process
at WHO headquarters). Reproduce the same crisis response structure at all levels of
the organisation
Initial confusion of roles and
responsibilities (internal and
external)
Bring coordination of the Global Health Cluster, Global Outbreak Alert and Response
Network, emergency medical teams, and other partnerships under a single team within
the above department, merging equivalent functions
Lack of internal and external
accountability
Transactional costs
Problems with current structureFor an initial period (five years), make the crisis department dually accountable to the
director general and to an external, independent civil society governance committee,
modelled on the independent monitoring board of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative,
and empowered to make strategy, funding, work planning, and hiring decisions (similar
to the arrangement proposed by the German chancellor, Angela Merkel)
Radical human resources review and reinforcement of meritocratic policies
Internal resistance and conflictPrioritisation of political over
technical considerations
Establish procedures for rapid hiring and induction of emergency staff, minimising
existing human resources bottlenecks
Staff demotivation
Institute a robust system of performance management with clear pathways for excellent
and sub-par performers and proactive talent identification. Involve external appraisers
in the performance management of senior posts, based on concrete evidence of
effectiveness
Transactional costs
Damage to government relationsA non-meritocratic human
resources approach, with little
reference to crisis response
competencies
Commission an externally led review of existing senior and middle management role
holders in key positions involved with emergency management (including country
representatives in crisis-prone countries) against the emergency competency framework,
with a view to upgrading skills where required and discontinuing contracts if necessary
Enforce a moratorium on all political appointments. Hire competitively all positions at
all levels of the organisation, according to the “fit for purpose” principle
Lack of internal and external
accountability
Increased capacity to manage crises through coordination and leadership
Dependent on establishment of fit for
purpose human resource procedures
(see above)
A non-meritocratic human resources
approach, with little reference to
crisis response competencies
Develop a greatly enhanced professional cohort of emergency coordinators, information
managers/epidemiologists and public health advisers with readiness to deploy into
coordination or response management roles. This pool can sit within WHO or be
distributed among partner agencies but should be financially underwritten to guarantee
duration of contract and availability for surge deployments, and undergo the same
learning and development steps based on common protocols and tools
Costs of salaries, professional
development and deployment costs
Aloofness from civil society
partners and neglect of sector
coordination and leadership
functionsDefine key competencies (eg, leadership, risk taking, management, influencing, effective
communications), and technical skills required of non-emergency dedicated staff (country
representatives, other technical specialists in country offices) to repurpose their work
in times of crisis; ensure these staff undergo learning and professional development
to acquire these competencies and skills
(Note that various concepts for a so called global health emergency workforce led by
WHO have been put forward. Our proposal is that WHO should focus on establishing
skilled teams for leadership and coordination, not for actual operations)
Insufficient flexible funding for crisis
functions
Increased focus on setting sector standards and improving public health practice in crisis settings
External resistance by humanitarian
agencies
Aloofness from civil society
partners and neglect of sector
coordination and leadership
functions
Expand and repurpose WHO’s technical team in the new crises division, while also
drawing on specialties and skills present in partner agencies and academic centres of
excellence, so as to:
(i) review and update technical standards and competency frameworks for health
services and staff in crisis settings
(ii) set up and deliver sufficiently scaled headquarters and field based capacity building
programmes for humanitarian agencies, adherent to these standards
(iii) set up a programme for ongoing certification of health agencies and staff as fit to
operate in different crisis contexts. The emergency medical team model could be a
good foundation for such a programme
Conflict with other inter-agency
standard-setting initiatives
Step aside arrangements for emergencies
Internal resistance and conflictPrioritisation of political over
technical considerations
Predefine country offices that fulfil minimal criteria for being able to lead and manage
responses to all hazards. For any emergency in countries that do not meet these criteria,
as well as whenever responses meet certain size triggers (eg, level 3) or are not being
managed adequately locally, automatically shift responsibility for crisis management
to an emergency team deployed from headquarters, reporting to the crisis division and
managing relevant country office emergency staff
Increased friction between country,
regional and headquarters teams
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(continued)
Expected challenges/risksProblem(s) tackledProposal and specific actions or changes
All cluster coordination teams to be appointed and managed directly from headquarters
Specify the above arrangements as mandatory in a revised WHO emergency response
framework and clarify the roles of headquarters, regional, and country offices
Enhanced transparency and open performance monitoring
Internal resistancePrioritisation of political over
technical considerations
Establish an independent pool of experienced public health and health systems
evaluators/researchers who can be mobilised at the time of emergencies and
immediately afterwards
Damage to government and donor
relations
Undertake systematic and structured evaluations of WHO responses to emergencies,
with scope dependent on the importance of the response (eg, UN level of the emergency),
commissioned by the external governance board (proposed above) to a non-UN
independent evaluation team (see above), measuring performance against key standards,
identifying key weaknesses and proposing modifications
Ensure open publication of each evaluation, making it clear which WHO teams were
accountable for the response being evaluated, what actions have been agreed to
address recommendations of the evaluation, and who is responsible for implementing
these actions
Costs of evaluationsLack of internal and external
accountability
Make decisions of global concern public and transparent
*Some of the proposals described here are similar to those made by the executive board and other groups.11 13 14
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